Preliminary. Comments Welcome.
Large budget deficits and a sluggish world economy have forced governments worldwide to tighten regulations and intensify corporate audits in the hope of raising tax revenues. Among the key targets sought by tax authorities are multinational corporations (MNC). While their rapidly growing global activities generate large taxable revenues, MNCs pay a significantly smaller portion of that revenue in income taxes due to their ability to shift income to/from foreign affiliates. 1 Concerns over tax avoidance have intensified so much in recent years that international taxation regulation has become a top priority on the agenda of the OECD and G8 country meetings. 2 A vehicle commonly used by MNCs to shift profits across countries is intra-firm trade. The pricing of goods exchanged between related parties -known as transfer pricing -has a direct effect on the distribution of revenues across foreign affiliates facing different corporate tax rates.
By underpricing exports shipped from a high tax country to an affiliate in a low tax country, an MNC is able to reduce its effective tax rate. 3 A classic case study of this profit shifting strategy involved the chemical company Du Pont de Nemours. In 1959, Du Pont created a wholly-owned Swiss marketing and sales subsidiary -Du Pont International S.A. ("DISA"), who distributed all Du Pont chemical products outside the USA. According to court documents, Du Pont's "internal memoranda were replete with references to tax advantages, particularly in planning prices on Du Pont goods to be sold to [DISA] . The tax strategy was simple. If Du Pont sold its goods to [DISA] at prices below fair market value, [DISA] , upon resale of the goods, would recognize the greater part of the total profit (i.e., manufacturing and selling profits). Since this foreign subsidiary could be located in a country where its profits would be taxed at a much lower level than the parent Du Pont would be taxed here, the enterprise as a whole would minimize its taxes." 4 Given this evidence, the United States was able to adjust Du Pont's transfer price.
1 In Denmark, our data source for the empirical analysis, the evidence suggests that."30% of all foreign and 28% of all Danish multinational companies have paid no company tax in the period 2006 -2008 ." (KPMG, 2010 .
2 In a recent address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the British prime minister expressed the intention to "use the G8 [presidency] to drive a more serious debate on tax evasion and tax avoidance. [...] There are some forms of avoidance that have become so aggressive [...] it is time to call for more responsibility and for governments to act accordingly." (Cameron, 2013) . Soon after Davos, the OECD published a report calling for the participation of all members to a "comprehensive action plan" to reform the current tax rules, which "may not have kept pace with the changing business environment.", OECD (2013) .
3 Another common method to shift profits across locations is debt financing. Given that the interest on debt is tax deductible, MNCs benefit from having affiliates in low tax locations lend to affiliates in high tax locations, who can minimize their tax base by the amount of interest payments. For empirical evidence, see Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) and among others.
4 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company v. the United States., 608 F.2d 445 (Fed. Cir. 1979) After the Du Pont case, companies have been requested to record their strategies for setting internal prices. Regulation has developed over time and it requires MNCs to evaluate for taxation purposes intra-firm transactions at the same unit values as charged to unaffiliated parties. This is known as the arm's length principle of taxation. Often times, however, it is difficult to choose the appropriate price to use as benchmark for intra-firm transactions. This makes identifying transfer price manipulations a challenge for tax authorities, and a difficult empirical task for researchers.
In this paper we estimate the extent to which transfer pricing of tangible exports is used by multinational corporations as a strategy to shift profits to countries with a lower tax than their home country (i.e., low tax regime). Using a rich firm and transaction level dataset for Denmark, we propose a novel identification strategy that exploits information on the multinational firms who establish new foreign affiliates in markets where they previously exported. Our triple difference estimation method isolates the change in export prices in response to a switch in foreign firm ownership status or a movement in foreign corporate tax rates, while controlling for firm, country and time fixed effects. To motivate our research objective, figure 1 provides preliminary evidence of the average change in the unit value of a product exported by an MNC relative to an exporteronly firm, upon establishing foreign ownership in destination countries with lower tax rates than
Denmark. The direction of change in MNC export prices is consistent with transfer pricing, however it is unclear whether tax savings are the reason behind the observed price difference. 5
To guide our empirical analysis, we propose a theory framework that formalizes the taxation problem of a multinational corporation. When intra-firm trade accounts for a significant fraction of an MNC's cross-border activity, we show that the gains from shifting profits to a lower tax location are large enough to induce firms to manipulate transfer prices. While this is a known prediction in the transfer pricing literature, a less known result is the fact that in the presence of tax avoidance penalties that are proportional to the withheld tax liability, firms have a strategic incentive to deviate the arm's length export price from its profit maximizing level to a value that is closer to the transfer price level in order to reduce the price difference and comply with the arm's length principle of taxation. The larger the share of intra-firm trade to a destination, the more willing MNCs are to sacrifice profits from unaffiliated party transactions in exchange for larger after-tax profits obtained by minimizing the global tax burden via transfer pricing.
This theoretical finding has important implications. It provides a new explanation for why
MNCs' current arm's length export prices should not be used as comparable uncontrolled prices, in spite of the existing regulation. Several recent papers have argued that the arm's length taxation principle is a distortionary rule because even in the absence of tax differences across countries, profit maximizing MNCs would optimally set intra-firm prices at a level that is different from the arm's length price. 6 Therefore, to make informative statements about profit shifting via transfer price manipulations, one needs to separately identify the changes in transfer prices induced by differences in corporate tax rates from changes in transfer prices for reasons related to optimal intra-firm organization. Given our triple difference estimation method, we are able to explicitly make this distinction by separately identifying the changes in unit values associated with owning an affiliate in a country with the same tax rate as the home country, as opposed to strictly higher, or strictly lower tax rates.
The finding that arm's length export prices respond to foreign tax rates in the presence of profit shifting incentives by MNCs also points to a potential downward bias in estimating transfer price manipulations. By comparing a firm's arm's length and intra-firm trade transactions contemporaneously, the calculated price wedge between the two types of trade is going to underestimate the actual response of transfer prices to changes in tax rates. The appeal of our empirical approach is in overcoming this challenge. By comparing an MNC's pricing behavior before and after setting up an affiliate in a foreign country, we are assessing the price wedge using arm's length prices from a period when the firm had no incentive to deviate from profit maximizing price levels.
In implementing our estimation strategy, we use firm and transaction level data for Denmark for the period 1999 -2006. There are several advantages in departing from U.S. data on which the bulk of the exiting evidence relies. First, Denmark has a territorial taxation system, unlike the residential taxation system in the U.S. 7 This distinction is relevant for our purposes because the potential gains from transfer price manipulations, and thus the incentive to shift profits internationally, are expected to be larger under territorial taxation systems (Hines, 1996; Swenson, 2001 ).
Furthermore, the territorial taxation system is the most pervasive taxation system in the world, which makes our findings more generalizable to other environments. Second, historically Denmark has imposed conservative levels of corporate tax rates. This implies that at each point in time there exists a sizeable number of important foreign markets that fall into a high tax regime, or a low tax regime, defined relative to the home country tax rate. 8 We are going to exploit this feature of our data by allowing for differences in the elasticity of transfer prices with respect to changes in high versus low corporate tax rates. A reason to suspect asymmetric price effects comes from the unbalanced effort of tax authorities to verify profit shifting in the case of an increase, as opposed to a decrease in the domestic tax base.
This paper brings significant evidence showing that Danish multinational firms use transfer pricing to shift profits towards low tax locations. We find that a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign tax rate below Denmark's rate induces an MNC to lower its export price by 5.7 percent when selling to a market with established foreign ownership, relative to non-affiliated exporters (6.5 percent if the good is differentiated according to Rauch (1999) classification). The fall in the MNC's export price is even larger when estimated on the subsample of firms who establish new affiliates during the sample period. Our results indicate that a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign tax rate below that in the home country leads to a 9.1 percent fall in the export prices of MNCs relative to non-affiliated exporters (9.7 percent if the good is differentiated). The results for high tax countries are more sensitive to the data variation being exploited.
Our findings contribute to several areas of on-going research. A large empirical literature documents the profit shifting behavior of MNCs as a response to differences in corporate tax rates across countries. 9 While most studies find that MNCs earn higher profit margins in low corporate tax locations, they do not shed light on the mechanisms by which profit shifting occurs. From a policy perspective, these results are less informative as they provide no guidance on the kind of 8 In this paper, we define a low (high) tax regime as a country with a lower (higher ) tax rate than the home country. This is not to be confused with the terminology from other papers where low tax jurisdictions are considered tax havens (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006) .
9 Grubert and Mutti (1991) use U.S. data on outward FDI to show that the after-tax profit rates of foreign affiliates are negatively related to effective income tax rates, and also that net capital investments are larger in countries with lower tax rates. Hines and Rice (1994) focus on U.S. FDI in low tax countries and tax havens, and find even larger elasticities of income and real activity to tax rates. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) use industry level data for 22 OECD countries to show that when transfer prices are manipulated by multinational firms, the true and reported net value added will differ because of income shifting, making the inverse of the labor cost share a direct function of corporate tax rate differences across countries. More recently, provide evidence that foreign owned plants make lower tax payments than domestic ones after controlling for observable plant characteristics, attributing most of this tax savings to profit rather than debt shifting. For comprehensive surveys of the literature see Hines (1999) and Devreux (2006) . regulation that is needed to secure a country's income tax base.
Few studies provide direct evidence for transfer pricing as an important mechanism of profit shifting. Swenson (2001) uses product level U.S. import data for the period 1981-1988 to examine the response of average unit values to import tariffs and corporate tax rate differences across countries. While she finds evidence for income shifting through transfer pricing, the effects are economically small. Using better data (i.e., detailed monthly BLS price data for over 22,000 products traded by the U.S. between 1997 and 1999), Clausing (2003) brings evidence suggesting significantly larger transfer price manipulations: a 1 percent drop in the foreign corporate tax rate is associated with 0.94 percent lower intra-firm export prices. However, conducting the empirical analysis at firm level is essential given the abundant evidence on the selection of firms into foreign markets and trade modes based on productivity levels. 10 Using longitudinal data on U.S. MNC exports to both affiliated firms and unrelated parties in a market, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) exploit within firm deviations in intra-firm export prices from their arm's length counterparts and relate them to differences in tax rates across countries. As expected, once accounting for firm characteristics, the estimated effects become smaller compared to Clausing (2003) : a 1 percentage point drop in foreign tax rates raises intra-firm export prices by 0.66 percent.
A second line of research this paper relates to is the recent work on intra-firm trade. The increasing importance of MNCs and the continuous fragmentation of production processes across national borders have accelerated the growth of intra-firm trade as a fraction of world trade. Furthermore, the volume and composition of intra-firm transactions have played a key role in explaining the geography of multinational production (Keller and Yeaple, 2012; Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2012; Cristea, 2012) . By investigating the differences between the reported and actual trade unit values, this paper documents a generally neglected reason -corporate taxes -for why intra-firm trade may vary systematically across countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theory framework to motivate the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the estimation strategy, highlighting the sources of identification. The data are detailed in section 4, while the estimation results are discussed in section 5. The main policy implications are summarized in section 6, and section 7 concludes. 10 The seminal paper in the trade literature on heterogeneous firms is Melitz (2003) . An extension that incorporates FDI decisions is Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) . In a recent paper, Bauer and Langenmayr (2013) show how by setting transfer prices at market values determined by outside firms automatically leads to systematic overpricing and profit shifting by multinational firms as a consequence of firm sorting into organizational forms.
This section formalizes the change in export prices that takes place upon a firm's direct investment in a foreign market. The interest is on price changes that are determined by profit shifting motives rather than production decisions. Therefore, we separate the decision to locate capital in foreign markets from the decision to locate income resulting from these productive capital investments, and focus only on the latter decision. That is, conditional on establishing presence in a foreign market, we examine how the expanding multinational firm allocates its profit between locations through transfer pricing. The choice of export prices is determined by the multinational firm's objective to maximize after tax global profits, and so it is going to be related to the foreign corporate tax rate.
In order to focus on the optimal pricing decisions of a firm i that exports product k to foreign market j, we keep the theoretical framework simple by depicting a static two-country model of frictionless trade. We assume that product k is a differentiated good, whose demand is derived from CES preferences. The exporting firm i has monopoly power in all its markets, and so does the foreign affiliate in country j. For simplicity, the foreign affiliate performs no production activities, serving only a distribution role in the local market. This simplification circumvents the discussion about offshoring decisions that arises with the expansion of multinational production. 11
We assume the two countries are identical except for their corporate tax rates. Letting τ j denote the corporate tax rate in the foreign country j, we write the tax rate in the home country of firm i as τ j + h, ∀h. Thus, h captures the tax rate difference between the home and host countries.
Depending on the sign of the tax wedge h, the corporate tax rate in the home country may be larger (i.e., h > 0), equal (i.e., h = 0), or smaller (i.e., h < 0) than in the foreign country j.
Since all export flows are from the home country of firm i to foreign destination j in product k, we drop the ijk subscript from the notation, unless necessary.
The Taxation Problem of a Multinational Firm
The parent and affiliate firms are establishments integrated in the same corporation, but for tax purposes they act as separate entities. Each firm makes decisions so as to maximize after tax prof-11 Recent evidence suggests that a significant share of intra-firm trade is motivated by distribution rather than production purposes. Using data for Germany, Krautheim (2012) and Kleinert and Toubal (2013) document that 46 percent of the foreign affiliates of German multinationals are classified as wholesale. The ratio of sales by wholesale affiliates over the sales of affiliates that are in the same manufacturing sector as their parent ranges between 0.3 and 1, depending on the sector.
its. Since the parent firm is making decisions by taking into consideration the corporation profits, it is in its interest to keep two sets of books: one for internal purposes, where intra-firm prices are optimally chosen to maximize global profits, and one for taxation purposes, where intra-firm transfers are evaluated following the arm's length principle.
Foreign Affiliate's Problem:
The foreign affiliate indexed by f only trades with the parent firm. It imports product k at the intra-firm incentive rate c f and re-sells it in the local market. The intra-firm incentive rate represents the internal price that is chosen by the parent firm to incentivize the affiliate manager to take optimal decisions that maximize total corporation profits. The foreign affiliate decides the import quantity q f and sale price p f to maximize its after tax profits.
The income before tax is given by:π
where fixed costs are set to zero for simplicity.
For tax purposes, the affiliate firm has to report an intra-firm invoice price that is consistent with transfer pricing (TP) regulations. Denoting by p tp the transfer price reported to tax authorities, the tax paid by the foreign affiliate is:
This implies that the after tax profits maximized by the affiliate firm are given by:
Since the foreign affiliate has a monopoly on the product variety sold in the local market, it follows that the optimal sale price set by the affiliate firm is:
where σ is the CES elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Parent Firm's Problem:
The parent firm (headquarters) indexed by p produces product k at a constant marginal cost c, and exports it to the foreign affiliate as well as to unrelated parties located in foreign country j. The parent chooses the price and quantity for each type of transaction to maximize after-tax corporate profits.
Denoting by p al the arm's length price, and by q al the quantity sold by the parent firm to unaffiliated parties, then the pre-tax profit of the parent firm can be written as:
where again we assume that fixed costs are zero for simplicity.
For tax purposes, the parent firm must report an intra-firm transfer price p tp to the home country's tax authorities. The resulting tax paid by the parent firm is given by:
which leads to after-tax headquarter profits equal to:
The headquarter chooses the intra-firm incentive price c f , the transfer price p tp , and the arm's length price p al so as to maximize global corporate profits, π c :
A couple of things are worth pointing out about equation (8). First, while the intra-firm incentive price c f does not enter the expression for after-tax corporate profit directly, the level of c f implicitly affects after-tax profits via its impact on the affiliate's local resale price p f (see equation (4)). Similarly, the transfer price p tp has both a direct effect on the after-tax corporate profits, as well as an indirect effect operating via its impact on the affiliate's local resale price p f .
Recognizing this profit shifting strategy of MNCs, many governments around the world have adopted the arm's length principle of taxation in order to protect their income tax base. This principle regulates the intra-firm transaction price that must be reported for taxation purposes, setting it at the same level at which that transaction would take place were the parties unaffiliated.
The multinational firm faces a penalty for not complying with the arm's length principle.
This penalty is proportional to the value of miss-reported taxable income. Following Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), we assume the following functional form for the penalty function: 12
Therefore, unless the MNC chooses a transfer price that is equal to the price charged to unaffiliated parties, it faces a positive penalty. The parameter λ plays at least two roles. On one hand, it accounts for the quality of tax compliance supervision, which determines the probability that a firm is caught deviating from the arm's length principle. At the same time, λ may also stand for the fraction of the mis-reported income that needs to be paid as penalty.
The first order conditions from maximizing equation (8) subject to penalty charges are:
After some algebra we derive the following relationship between the transfer price and the arm's length price: 13
12 Swenson (2001) also uses a penalty function that is very similar to this one. 13 To solve for the transfer price ppt from equation (12), note that the first term inside the square brackets can be substituted for using equation (4), while the remaining terms in the square brackets can be substituted for using equation (11). Upon making these substitutions, the first line of equation (12) becomes zero, leading to equation (13) Equation (13) shows that for exports to low tax countries (i.e., h > 0), the parent firm sets the transfer price below the arm's length price. Their price difference increases in the tax wedge and decreases in the tax penalty. This result is well known in the literature on transfer pricing. Most of the empirical analyses to date focus on the price gap p tp − p al to examine the effect of foreign corporate tax rates on transfer pricing.
In the remainder of the section we show that Equation (13) does not reflect the true extent of profit shifting. The arm's length price p al changes systematically with the tax wedge h, which distorts the difference between p tp and a true reference price defined as the counterfactual intra-firm price set by the MNC in the absence of profit shifting incentives for tax saving purposes.
First, we show that the arm's length price p al is skewed by the motivation to shift profits.
By solving for the tax difference h from equation (13) and substituting its solution into the first order condition for the arm's length price (10), we find:
where
This arm's length price is dependent on κ(h), which is a function of the tax wedge. Note that κ(h)
is increasing in h and has the same sign as h.
Similarly, the transfer price p tp can be derived as:
which shows it is dependent on the tax wedge h. Incentives to reduce taxes will skew both the arm's length price and the transfer price set by the multinational firm. The extent of profit shifting is given by the difference between p tp in equation (16) and the counterfactual intra-firm export price p 0 obtained when the firm has no incentives to shift profits. To measure the extent of profit shifting via transfer pricing, we first derive the MNC's transfer price absent tax reducing incentives, i.e., when h = 0:
where p 0 represents the market price that the firm would have charged in an identical destination, but where it had no incentives to manipulate prices for tax purposes. The difference between the transfer price the firm charges and this counterfactual intra-firm market price is given by:
The term in the square bracket has the same sign as h. When the home country has a higher tax rate than the foreign country (i.e., h > 0), the multinational firm prices its affiliated exports below the counterfactual reference price in order to reduce its tax burden.
The price difference p tp − p 0 measures the true effect of foreign corporate taxes on transfer pricing. This is radically different than the price gap in equation (13), which is the focus of the existing transfer pricing literature. By estimating equation (13), the literature assumes that p al is equal to p 0 , the counterfactual reference price that is unaffected by tax incentives. However, the deviation of p al from p 0 can be calculated as:
The negative sign in front of the two positive terms implies that when h > 0, corresponding to the case where the home country has a higher tax rate than the foreign country, the firm will lower its arm's length prices to independent parties. Note that, like p tp , p al = p 0 when h = 0.
The main justification for manipulating p al is to reduce the tax burden. Since MNCs' objective is to maximize after-tax corporate profits, the firms that trade extensively with their foreign affiliates are willing to undertake small cuts from the profit margins of unaffiliated transactions in order to engage in profit shifting and benefit from a reduction in the global tax burden, while still complying with transfer pricing regulations by keeping the price wedge p tp − p al small.
We formalize the implications of equations (13), (18), and (19) into the following proposition:
A multinational corporation exporting goods to foreign affiliates engages in profit shifting by underpricing its intra-firm exports relative to unaffiliated transactions when shipping to affiliates in low tax countries, while overpricing export shipments to affiliates located in high tax countries.
The MNC optimally chooses to lower (raise) its arm's length transaction price in low (high) corporate tax rate countries to facilitate profit shifting via transfer pricing behavior while mitigating the incidence of tax penalties. Formally:
Proof : Follows directly from equation (18) However, we show using a standard model of taxation that this difference does not fully account for the magnitude of the price manipulations motivated by profit shifting. To correctly determine the extent of profit shifting via transfer price manipulations, we need to infer from the data the counterfactual export price level p 0 and use it as a reference. This study does so by using a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation method.
Estimation Strategy
Proposition 1 provides predictions about the relationship between the export price charged by a multinational firm and the counterfactual reference price p 0 that it would charge in that market, should there be no incentives to shift profits and minimize the tax burden. However we cannot observe the counterfactual reference export price p 0 . To overcome this challenge, we propose a difference-in-difference-in-differences ("DDD") estimation strategy. We exploit a novel source of variation coming from the establishment of new plants in foreign markets characterized by various levels of statutory corporate tax rates. More precisely, we are interested in estimating the effect of owning an affiliate in a foreign market (first treatment) on the average prices of a product exported to that market, differentiating between countries with corporate tax rates above or below the rate of the home country (second treatment). Within a given product category and foreign destination market, the pure exporting firms to that market represent the omitted group relative to which multinational firms are compared.
In this section, we show how the predictions of proposition 1 can be tested with fourdimensional panel spanning firm-product-destination-time space. We begin this section by pre-senting a simplified version of our estimation strategy, stripping away the complications of the data. We then discuss how we implement the strategy in the data, and how we control for the various idiosyncrasies in our sample.
3.1 A difference-in-difference-in-differences methodology for export prices
We consider the export of a product to a low tax regime country j in two time periods t ∈ {1, 2} by two types of firms i, with i ≡ x for firms that are pure exporters in both periods, and i ≡ a for firms that establish an affiliate in country j between the two periods. We define a firm-country pair ij as a trade transaction and deem the trade transactions for i ≡ a as our first treatment group.
To simplify the exposition, for now we assume that once firm i owns a foreign affiliate all exports to market j are intra-firm. Between periods 1 and 2 changes that are specific to the tax regime of country j and that affect all export flows will raise the price p xj1 to the level p xj2 . These regime-specific changes have the same effect on p aj2 . However, firm a also establishes an affiliate during this time. Therefore, the observed price p aj2 reflects both regime changes as well as foreign firm ownership changes. While we cannot directly measure the change in export prices due to foreign ownership, we can make the following inference: had firm a not acquired an affiliate in country j, we would expect p aj2 to be equal to the latent variable p
So, we can use p * aj2 to estimate the price change δ j attributed to establishing a foreign affiliate:
The variable δ j captures the price effects of acquiring an affiliate in country j.
If the price effects of acquiring an affiliate were constant across all destination countries j, then we could define δ j ≡ δ and estimate δ with a standard difference in difference estimator.
where h j follows the notation from the theory section and represents the corporate tax rate difference between home and foreign countries, while β 1 and β 2 are parameters.
The first term, β 1 , captures the average change in the export price of a good that switches from being traded only arm's length to possibly being traded intra-firm. 15 The second term, β 2 , captures those price effects that are correlated with country j's tax wedge, h j . If β 2 = 0, then the difference-in-difference approach is sufficient to capture the price effects of affiliate acquisition.
However, our theory suggests that the tax regime does affect the price. Proposition 1.iv combined with 1.i predicts that the difference between the transfer price and the export price becomes more negative as the tax wedge h increases in low tax regimes. 16 Approximating the relationship in 1.iv as linear, this prediction implies that β 2 < 0. In order to identify β 2 , we need at least one other low tax country j where h j = h j . Then, we estimate:
Equation 22 is the third difference in our triple difference (DDD) estimation methodology.
Implementing the triple difference methodology using the trade data
To implement our DDD methodology using the disaggregated Danish trade data, we need to incorporate the third difference equation (22) into a standard DD estimating equation, while taking account of the dimensionality of our trade dataset. Our panel spans four dimensions -firm, product, country, time -which we need to collapse into two dimensions for our empirical analysis. We 15 There are various reasons that could explain changes in the unit value of export transactions carried out by multinational firms. For example, upon establishing foreign ownership, MNCs may re-allocate production activities from the headquarters to the foreign plant. This has a direct effect on the production stage at which a good is being traded, affecting the unit values of export transactions. Since production fragmentation happens irrespective of the corporate tax rate in the foreign market, the coefficient β1 on the affiliate dummy would automatically capture these effects. In fact, any systematic price changes associated with establishing a new plant in a foreign market that are not caused by profit shifting motives should be captured by the foreign affiliate indicator.
16 Proposition 1.i and 1.ii similarly predict that the the difference becomes more positive in high tax regimes. To simplify exposition in this section, we postpone that discussion until the next section.
define our panel unit of observation as a trade transaction by firm i to country j in product k, and evaluate the effects of our two treatments -changes in foreign firm ownership and in foreign tax rates -on the export prices of the observed trade transactions over time.
To formalize our DDD discussion, consider the export price p ijkt for a firm i exporting product k to market j at time t, and let DAf f ijt denote an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has an affiliate in j at time t. Let the export price p ijkt of a trade transaction be characterized by:
where α indexes fixed effects: α ijk captures any unobservable time-invariant price characteristic for a given firm-country-product trade transaction, while α t captures time-specific price shocks. δ measures the price effect of owning an affiliate in a market and trading intra-firm, and the vectors X it and X jt represent observable, time-varying firm, respectively foreign country control variables. 17
denotes the error term.
If the price effects of acquiring an affiliate were not dependent on the tax regime of country
jt ) and so, adding the tax wedge variable h j to the regression model would be superfluous. However, our theory suggests that the tax regime of a country is a key omitted variable in the export price regression.
In fact, equation (21) formalizes this direct relation. Substituting equation (21) for δ in the export price equation (23), and defining the tax wedge h j ≡ |∆τ jt | × I LowTax for the case when country j is a low tax country, leads to the following regression equation:
This equation is a difference-in-difference-in-difference regression that captures the price effects of acquiring an affiliate in a low tax country. Our goal is to separately identify what fraction of this total price change is driven by differences in corporate tax rates (as opposed to other factors 17 In the estimation, the vector Xit includes information on firm level employment and sales, while the vector Xjt includes information on country level population and real per capita GDP, on exchange rates and statutory corporate tax rates. These control variables are important not only because they determine export prices, but also because they influence the decision to establish a foreign affiliate. For example, di Giovanni (2005) finds evidence of a significant negative effect of corporate tax rates on M&As, while Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) provides evidence that large, fast growing MNCs are more likely to establish tax haven operations, affecting their ability to shift income and reduce the global tax burden.
that affect export prices at the time of establishing foreign ownership). In the regression model, this is captured by the coefficient β 2 . While β 1 capture the average price effect of acquiring an affiliate, the additional deviation in export prices across destinations of lower corporate tax rates reveals the firm's profit shifting behavior via transfer pricing. Thus, our variable of interest -the interaction between owning a foreign affiliate and the tax rate difference for low tax regime countries -strictly identifies the change in intra-firm export prices driven by profit shifting motives.
We expand the regression model in equation (23) in two ways. First, we add another interaction term to capture the price effect of owning an affiliate in a foreign country with a higher corporate tax rate than the home market. Although the theory framework does not suggest differential price responses to a change in the tax wedge based on the foreign country tax regime, we nevertheless allow for such asymmetries in the estimation. 18 Second, we allow the year fixed effects α t to vary by the tax regime of the foreign country, i.e., higher tax rate or lower tax rate compared to the home market. Thus, we denote by α t,LowTax and α t,HighTax the interaction terms between the year fixed effects and the corresponding tax regime indicators. In adding these differential time effects, we aim to control for unobservable time-varying factors affecting export prices that may be specific to countries that set higher tax rates, respectively lower tax rates.
With these additional control variables, our regression model becomes:
This is the estimation equation that we take to the data. To account for possible correlations in export prices among all the Danish firms trading with the same foreign market, we cluster the standard errors by country-year pairs.
18 Asymmetries in MNCs' responses to corporate tax rate differences may be explained, for example, by the unequal efforts of the home country tax authorities to inspect and detect transfer pricing in transactions with high tax countries, relative to low tax countries. At the same time, it could be the case that governments in high tax countries may have on average a stronger tax enforcement power, deterring Danish MNCs from engaging in transfer pricing.
To estimate our model, we employ micro level data from Denmark. We combine two data sources on Danish firms, one providing information on all international trade transactions, and the other on firms' ownership of foreign assets.
Our firm level data comes from the administrative records maintained by Statistics Denmark.
The Firm Statistics Register covers the universe of private sector Danish firms, with each firm identified by a unique numeric code to facilitate drawing information on firm characteristics and activities from multiple administrative registries. For each firm we observe the employment size and level of sales, the industry affiliation (eight digit NACE code) for all its productive activities, and all the international transactions reported in customs statistics.
For the estimations in this paper, we only focus on the sample of manufacturing exporters operating during the time period 1999-2006. Based on the information on annual exports recorded by value and by weight for each product code and foreign destination market, we determine the average transaction prices (i.e., unit values) by dividing export values by the quantities shipped at the firm-product-destination level of detail. In constructing the sample, we drop the observations with negative or missing export values, or for which we cannot measure average export prices because of zero or missing weight values. 19 We further drop the top and bottom 1 percent of prices to eliminate measurement or keying errors.
To obtain information on foreign direct investments (FDI) involving Danish firms, we use data on foreign firm ownership shares provided by Experian. Experian collects firm level information on foreign ownership from the annual reports published by Danish firms, which are supplemented with information from the transaction records maintained by the National Bank of Denmark. 20 Each firm is reported in the dataset with the same unique numeric firm identifier as employed by Statistics Denmark.
Based on the firm level information available in the Experian database, we construct two indicator variables of foreign ownership. First, we identify the manufacturing firms that operate in Denmark during our sample period and that are foreign owned (i.e., majority shares are owned 19 We lose approximately 4 percent of the data because of such data reporting issues. 20 The set of firms reported in the database may not cover the entire population of Danish firms undertaking foreign direct investments. In spite of that, the data provided by Experian is of very high quality, being widely used by analysts and researchers. In fact, this is the primary data source on Danish firms used in Bureau van Dijk's Orbis and Amadeus databases.
by foreign nationals). This foreign ownership indicator corresponds to a fraction of the inbound FDI activity in Denmark. 21 In a similar manner, we track Denmark's outward FDI activity by identifying the countries in which a Danish firm holds majority ownership of a local establishment.
In the end, the resulting firm level dataset on foreign direct investments reports for each Danish firm information about its foreign ownership status, and its multinational activity, with a complete list of foreign markets in which the firm owns affiliates.
To construct our estimation sample, we merge the firm level information on asset ownership by foreign country with corresponding customs data on export transactions. Important for our purposes, the resulting dataset reports for each manufacturing exporter the transaction prices of all products shipped to a particular foreign market, and whether the firm owns a foreign affiliate in that location. 22 Unfortunately we do not have information on whether the beneficiary of a particular export transaction is a related party or an unaffiliated buyer. So, we rely on the expectation that whenever an exporter owns a firm in a foreign market, at least a fraction of the observed export shipments must be intra-firm. This means that the product level transaction price observed in foreign markets where the firms owns a foreign affiliate represents a weighted average of intra-firm and arm's length prices. This is important for interpreting the results from our estimation exercises. We augment the Danish firm level dataset with foreign country level information on population, per-capita GDP, real exchange rate and statutory corporate tax rate. All the country level variables are taken from the Penn World Tables version 3.0. except for corporate tax information, which is collected from the OECD Tax Database and, for non-OECD countries, from the World Tax Database provided by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. We use the statutory corporate tax rates to compute the difference in absolute value between the tax rate of a foreign country and that of Denmark. In doing so, we track the countries with tax rates above or below Denmark's by creating indicator variables equal to one if a country has High Tax or Low Tax respectively.
21 FDI statistics are defined based on a minimum threshold of 10 percent ownership share. By disregarding foreign investment activities that fall short of the 50 percent majority ownership break point, our indicator measure of foreign ownership underestimates the volume of inbound FDI. The same comment applies to outbound FDI, given our interest in majority-owned foreign affiliates of Danish multinational firms.
22 For all the firms that establish a foreign affiliate during the sample period, we remove the observation corresponding to the actual year of acquisition. This is done in order to mitigate measurement error in export unit values. This way we can be sure that when DAff =1 (DAff =0), the pricing strategy of the Danish exporter is characterized 100 percent by its MNC (exporter-only) status.
To summarize the tax rate dynamics in our data, Figure 2 illustrates the time trend for the Danish corporate tax rate in comparison to the tax levels in several top export destination markets. Figure 3 provides a histogram of the corporate tax rate difference between Denmark and its foreign trade partner. Both data plots convey a similar message: the level of the Danish statutory corporate tax rate is conservative, in that there are important trade partners that charge significantly higher, or significantly lower tax rates. The dispersion in the foreign corporate tax rates around the level in Denmark also provides useful variation that will be exploited in our estimation exercises through the use of the constructed tax wedge variable.
To conclude the discussion on the data sources and sample construction, Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the variables in our final dataset. A unit of observation is a firm-productcountry-year quadruplet. Trade transactions carried by Danish multinationals in foreign markets where they have majority owned affiliates represent 11.4 percent of all observations. Almost 3 percent of all trade transactions correspond to Danish multinationals that establish their first majority owned affiliate in a country during our sample period. Even though by count the number of export transactions handled by Danish multinationals is not large, in value terms they account for a significant fraction of total Danish exports. Table 2 provides evidence in support of this.
The reported summary statistics are constructed by year at firm-country level in order to illustrate the exceptional growth and export performance of Danish multinationals in countries where they establish foreign ownership.
Estimation Results
In this section we examine the extent to which Danish multinational firms shift profits to low tax locations via transfer price manipulations. In estimating the regression model given by equation (25), we exploit a novel source of variation: the establishment of new foreign affiliates by Danish multinationals in countries where they have previously exported. This allows us to investigate whether the changes in the product level export prices determined by new foreign firm ownerships are systematically related to difference in corporate tax rates across countries. Throughout our analysis, we treat firms' foreign direct investment decisions as exogenous, once conditioning on the regression control variables. 23 Table 3 reports the effects of the corporate tax wedge on the price of a multinational's exports to a low/high tax destination, after controlling for all the relevant dimensions of data heterogeneity that may affect the estimates. Overall, we find significant evidence that firms lower the price of exports to low tax countries where they own affiliates. As column 1 shows, a 10 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate in a low tax country corresponds to a 5.7 percent decrease in the price of its exports, relative to a pure exporter shipping to the same market. This result is consistent with our theory that Danish multinationals use low export prices to shift profits to low tax destinations as a way to avoid taxation. We also find evidence that multinational firms price their exports higher in high tax countries where they own an affiliate, by comparison to pure exporters. However, the results are statistically insignificant. Later, we will show subsamples where this price difference becomes weakly significant.
Baseline Specification
The results reported in column 1 of Table 3 could be biased by two sources of endogeneity.
First, Danish firms that own affiliates in foreign countries could also themselves be affiliates of a foreign multinational firm. It may be that Danish firms owned by foreign multinationals make different transaction decisions than their domestic counterparts, particularly because of their involvement in the tax avoidance strategies decided by their parent firms. Second, our estimation relies on the data variation observed when a firm establishes an affiliate in a foreign country. If the firm sets up the affiliate in response to a decline in prices in low tax countries, then this generates ambiguity in the direction of causation between acquisition and fallings prices.
We address these two issues in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 . We add a control dummy variable indicating the foreign ownership of the Danish firm, and a pre-MNC indicator controlling for the price of that firm-product-destination export transaction in the year prior to the establishment of a foreign affiliate. As the results in column 2 show, foreign ownership has no statistically significant effect on export prices. The estimates from column 3 also suggest that export prices do not change significantly the year prior to foreign firm ownership. If anything, the price of exports to low tax countries set by future multinational firms actually increases slightly the year before this change of status, relative to pure exporters.
In identifying MNCs' pricing behavior, we exploit two sources of data variation: the first comes from changes in countries' corporate tax rates relative to Denmark's tax rate, and the second comes from the transformation of an exporter-only firm into a multinational firm through the establishment of a foreign affiliate. To separate the effects associated with each source of data variation, we examine subsets of our treatment group. The results are summarized in Table 4 .
First, we drop the pre-acquisition exports of firms that will acquire an affiliate sometime during our sample period. In doing so, we are left with firm-product-country exporting spells that are entirely attributed to pure exporters or to multinational firms. Our only source of data variation and coefficient identification comes solely from changes in the tax wedge. Since any Danish firm in the sample is considered too small to influence politicians in foreign countries to change the corporate tax rate, this variation is entirely exogenous to the firm's behavior. That is, a country's tax policy is taken as given by each multinational corporation making intra-firm trade decisions.
As Table 4 column 1 reports, our main results hold true: multinationals selling to a low tax country will reduce the price of their exports by 6.36 percent in response to a 10 percentage point drop in that country's tax rate.
However, a concern with this source of data variation is a potential sluggishness in the adjustment of transfer prices to new price levels following changes in foreign tax rates, and thus in profit shifting opportunities. This is because multinationals with continuous foreign affiliates have a history of transfer prices that can be used by tax authorities towards detecting profit shifting motives whenever there is a simultaneous change in transfer prices and foreign corporate tax rates. As such, this may attenuate a firm's price response to a change in foreign corporate tax rates. Because of this consideration, we investigate the performance of our model on a sample of expanding multinational firms.
In our next estimation, we drop from the sample the export transactions of multinational firms that own affiliates in a given location for the entire sample period, and thus are never ob-served as pure exporters at any point during our sample period. In doing so, we eliminate data variation within firm-product-country triplets that come solely from movements in the tax wedge. 24 The resulting estimates are stronger. Table 4 column 2 shows an increase in the elasticity: a 10 percentage point decrease in a country's tax rate relative to Denmark's rate corresponds to an 8.24 percent decrease in affiliated exports. The results are even more pronounced when we restrict the treatment group to only those multinationals that establish a new affiliate, and thus remove the variation coming from closing down or selling an affiliate. Table 4 column 3 shows that for those multinationals that establish an affiliate in a low tax country, a 10 percentage point decrease in the tax rate relative to Denmark's corresponds to a 9.13 percent decrease in the export price. For this subsample, the tax wedge in high tax countries also significantly influences the average export price: a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of a high tax country relative to Denmark's corresponds to a 12.6 percent increase in the price of exports by multinationals.
Non-measureable characteristics of a particular product can also determine the extent to which a firm can shift profits. If a certain product is sold in a commodities market or has a reference price, the firm has a more difficult time explaining price differences to the tax authorities. 25 By contrast, prices of differentiated goods, however, can more easily hide profit shifting under the guise of product complexity or quality differentiation. To test this, we restrict the sample to products classified as "differentiated" based on the liberal classification proposed by Rauch (1999) . As observed from the results reported in Table 5 , transfer pricing is more pronounced among differentiated goods. This finding is consistent across the subsamples previously considered in Table 4 .
The estimates reported in column 1 suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the tax wedge determines MNCs owning foreign affiliates in low corporate tax countries to export their goods at prices 6.48 percent below the arm's length prices charged by comparable exporters. While not statistically significant, a 10 percentage point increase in the tax rate difference for high tax countries corresponds to a 4.09 percent increase in the price of exports by multinationals. These transfer pricing effects are much larger when estimated on the subsample of newly established affiliates. 24 One advantage in exploiting changes in foreign firm ownership is that it allows us to observe firms making transfer price decisions in a new environment that is not constrained by prior intra-firm transactions. We believe that such a scenario gives MNCs more bargaining power in defending their pricing strategies, potentially leading to larger estimates.
25 Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) provide descriptive evidence of low price differences between intra-firm and arm's length export prices for non-differentiated goods. Blonigen, Oldensky, and Sly (2011) infer from the response of U.S. multinational firms to Bilateral Tax Treaties that transfer price manipulations are less likely in firms that use intensively homogenous inputs.
Robustness Exercises
To ensure the robustness of our results, we verify the stability of our estimates to: 1) various sub-samples, 2) a narrower re-definition of the "treatment" group, and 3) possible non-linearities in the main effect.
The first data cut considers the existence of a double taxation agreement (DTT) between Denmark and each foreign country in the sample. These DTTs allow firms to credit foreign taxes against their domestic tax bill. In theory, they would encourage firms to shift more income. On the other hand, DTTs typically involve increased cooperation among partner countries in detecting and penalizing tax evasion, and this may refrain MNCs from using transfer pricing as a method to shift profits. Table 6 reports the estimation results from this sample cut. For comparison purposes column 1 reproduces the baseline coefficients from Table 3 and column 2 reproduces the coefficients from the differentiated goods subsample from Table 5 . Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates from the double taxation agreement sub-sample using export transactions of all goods and of differentiated goods respectively. While the sign and significance pattern is identical across the two columns, the magnitude of the estimates is larger in absolute value in the DTT sub-sample. If a country has a double taxation agreement with Denmark, then a 10 percentage points decrease in the foreign corporate tax rate below Denmark's rate results in MNCs lowering their prices by 6.34 percent on average when exporting to that destination. The fall in prices is slightly larger, 7.17 percent, if focusing on the differentiated goods subsample. This evidence is consistent with DTTs providing incentives for engaging in more profit shifting.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 , we report the estimates from a subsample of countries considered to have judicial systems of poor quality based on Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) measure of 'rule of law'. All else equal, these are the locations where the risk of penalty for profit shifting via transfer pricing is low. As expected, the estimates from columns 5 and 6 are much large in magnitude then their corresponding counterparts from the baseline specification in columns 1 and 2. The results suggests that Danish MNCs lower their price by 8.16 percent (8.28 percent for differentiated goods) when exporting to destinations that witness a fall in their corporate tax rate of 10 percentage points below Denmark's tax rate.
One inconvenience in our analysis comes from the inability to distinguish in our data between arm's length and intra-firm export transactions. While this is a non-trivial data limitation, the prediction of Proposition 1 in the theory is crucial in mitigating this concern. It shows that when a multinational firm can gain from shifting profits cross-border via transfer pricing, then the arm's length export price set by the firm is going to deviate from the profit maximizing level in the same direction and to a value that is closer to the level of the transfer price. This implies that an MNC's export price observed in the data -which is a weighted average of intra-firm and arm's length transaction prices -will be systematically different than the profit maximizing export price set by an unaffiliated firm. This explains our ability to identify significant effects in the first place.
However, our estimates understate the extent of transfer price manipulations. One way to mitigate this concern is to focus on specific firms or markets where we have reasons to expect that a larger share of MNCs' exports happen intra-firm.
In a separate robustness exercise, we re-define the treatment variable DAf f ijt to equal one if two conditions are satisfied simmultaneously: 1) firm i has majority ownership of at least one affiliate in country j at time t, and 2) the average quantity of a good exported to the foreign market increases after establishing a foreign affiliate compared to the pre-ownership period. By adding the second condition as necessary to define the treatment group, our intention is to identify from all the foreign firm ownership changes those cases that involve changes in real affiliate activity and that generate increased intra-firm trade. The drawback of this strategy, however, is that it further reduces the number of treated firms, possibly affecting the model identification and estimates' precision. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 report the estimation results based on the redefined DAf f ijt indicator variable. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficients of interest are larger in absolute value relative to the baseline results (columns 1 and 2). Even though the estimated standard errors are large, making the regression coefficients of interest significant only at 10 percent level, we nevertheless find evidence that firms lower their export prices by 10.7 percent (12.85 percent for differentiated goods) in response to a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign corporate tax relative to Denmark's.
Finally, the last robustness exercise that we consider addresses possible non-linearities in the effect of corporate tax rates on profit shifting via transfer pricing. We experiment with the idea that transfer pricing strategies may involve both a level change and a marginal effect that is proportional to the tax rate difference between countries. Several reasons motivate this extension of the baseline empirical model from equation (25) . For instance, the rapid expansion of Danish multinationals and the establishment of new foreign affiliates may first trigger a one time level change in transfer prices, which then evolves only subsequently and gradually according to the tax rate difference between host and home markets. At the same time, there may be a non-monotonic relation between the tax wedge and the transfer price manipulations across countries, which could affect the slope coefficient but not necessarily the intercept.
To implement empirically this idea, we take the indicator variables identifying if a country has a higher or lower tax rate relative to the tax rate in Denmark, and interact each of them with the foreign affiliate indicator to get at the level effect, and with the continuous interaction variable "affiliate×tax wedge" to obtain the marginal effect. That is, we estimate: Table 7 reports the results from estimating the above regression using the full data sample.
For comparison purposes, column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates from Table 3 while column 2 includes the specification with the additional interaction terms. Interestingly, the estimates suggest that while there is no level change in multinational firms' export prices to low tax destinations, there is a positive and significant level change in multinational firms' export prices to high tax countries. So, it is the insignificant but negative slope coefficient on the interaction term between the affiliate indicator and the tax wedge variable that makes the overall transfer price effect in high tax destinations insignificant. Evaluated at the sample average tax wedge, the marginal effects reported at the bottom of Table 7 are significant.
Policy Implications
This section provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation that quantifies the tax revenue lost by the Danish government due to the profit shifting activities of multinational firms, focusing on transfer price manipulations. 26 3 of Table 4 , a typical Danish multinational firm exporting to a host country with a tax rate that is 6.1 percentage points lower than Denmark's (i.e., our sample average tax wedge for low tax countries) will sell a given product at a price that is 5.6 percent lower than a pure exporter, on average. This drop in export prices reduces the revenue earned by Danish parent firms from international transactions, diminishing the income tax base in the home country. To calculate the total export revenue underreported to the Danish tax authorities in a given year, we use country specific information on the statutory corporate tax rate difference, rather than impose the sample average tax wedge for low tax countries. More precisely, we compute the following value: 27
where j indexes a destination country with a tax rate lower than Denmark's, β 2 is the coefficient on the interaction term DAf f ijt × |∆τ jt | × I LowTax from equation (25), and X M N C,j denotes the total volume of exports by Danish multinationals owning at least one affiliate in country j.
Using the export data for the last year of our sample, 2006, and the coefficient estimate from our regression reported in column 3 of Table 4 
Conclusions
Multinational corporations are beholden to their shareholders to maximize global profits. In pursuit of this goal, firms exploit differences in policies and tax rates across countries to minimize their tax burden. A consequence of reallocating profits across jurisdictions within multinational firms is the erosion of countries' reported income tax bases, despite the actual value of production activities 27 A similar calculation is done by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) using estimates based on U.S. data.
that occurs in those countries. Concerns over the extent of tax avoidance by multinational firms have risen so much in recent years that international taxation has now become a top priority for OECD and G8 member states.
In drafting action plans to fight the tax avoidance practices of multinational firms, tax authorities need to establish the main mechanisms through which profit shifting occurs. This paper contributes towards that goal by bringing evidence for profit shifting via transfer price manipulations of exported manufactured goods. Danish firms that own affiliates in low tax countries are found to underprice their exports relative to sales to affiliates in countries with the same tax rate as Denmark.
A contribution of this paper is to highlight a potential downward bias in measuring transfer pricing by the direct application of the arm's length principle of taxation. We show that multinationals who trade both with affiliated and unaffiliated parties have an incentive to deviate the arm's length invoice price from profit maximizing levels in order to reduce the gap from transfer prices and thus conceal profit shifting. To correct for this attenuation bias, we propose a triple difference estimation strategy that exploits a novel source of variation coming from the establishment of new plants in foreign markets characterized by various levels of statutory corporate tax rates.
Future research should examine transfer pricing strategies for a multinational firm shipping to multiple destinations. In this study, we concentrate only on bilateral trade between firms and countries in which they have an affiliate. However, we can further correct for international tax planning by studying how multinationals might hide profit shifting in one destination country by manipulating prices in another destination. Note: Each trend lines depicts the average export price charged by a multinational firm relative to an exporting firm for the same product shipped to the same destination market. The average relative export price is observed for 5 years before and after the multinational establishes its first foreign affiliate in that market, separately for countries with corporate tax rates below or above that for Denmark. Note: The figure above illustrates the movement export prices for two firms selling to country j. The econometrician observes the four prices pijt Firm a acquires an affiliate between the periods, so its counterfactual nonaffiliated price p * aj2 is not observed. For our triple difference strategy, we use (1) the difference in prices of firm x to estimate p * aj2 . We then use (2) the difference between p * aj2 and observed paj2 to estimate δj, the change in prices in country j. We also find a similar δs using export prices in destination s where there are no tax incentives to manipulate prices. Finally, we use (3) the difference between δj and δs to estimate the effect of the tax wedge in j on the movement of prices. Note: These numbers are taken from the initial tax_exports dataset that includes only firm-country-year information I further collapse the data at firm-country level by summing all observations Number Firm-Country Pairs Export Values
Note: The unit of observation in the dataset used for the constructing the above tabulation is a firm-country-year triplet. This means that every time a firm exports to a new market, or every time a MNC opens an affiliate in a new country, these are counted as though they would be new firms. Note: The table examines the effect of statutory corporate tax rates on the export price of Danish MNCs relative to exporter-only firms. The reported coefficients correspond to the regression equation (25) in the text, estimated across three different subsamples. All subsamples include the (common) reference group of exporter-only firms. In addition, the Continuous subsample includes only MNCs that own affiliates in a country throughout the sample period. The Non-Continous subsample includes all MNCs that change their foreign firm ownership in a market. The New Affiliates subsample includes only non-continous MNCs that acquire affiliates in a country during the sample period (rather than sell). All other explanations from the footnote in Table 3 apply. Note: The table examines the effect of statutory corporate tax rates on the export price of Danish MNCs relative to exporter-only firms. The reported coefficients correspond to the regression equation (25) in the text, estimated using exports of differentiated goods only (Rauch (1999) classification) and different data samples. Column 1 includes the trade transactions of differentiated goods carried by all firms, while column 2 and 3 restricts the set of MNCs included in the same way as in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 respectively. All other explanations from the footnote in Table 3 apply. Note: The table examines how robust is the effect of statutory corporate tax rates on the export price of Danish MNCs relative to exporter-only firms. The reported coefficients correspond to the regression equation (25) in the text, estimated across various subsamples. All variable descriptions from the footnote in Table 3 apply. For comparison purposes, columns 1 and 2 reproduce prior estimates from Table 3 column 1 and Table 5 column 1. Columns 3 and 4 are estimated based on a subsample of countries that have a Double Taxation Treaty with Denmark in force. Columns 5 and 6 are obtained based on the bottom half countries ranked in terms of judicial quality (based on Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) measure of 'rule of law'). Finally, columns 7 and 8 are estimated based only on MNCs that establish new affiliates during the sample period and are observed increasing exports to that market post-acquisition. (0.016) * * * * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at country-year level in parentheses.
Note: The table investigates non-linearities in the effect of statutory corporate tax rates on the export price of Danish MNCs relative to exporter-only firms. The reported coefficients correspond to the regression equation (26) in the text. All variable descriptions from the footnote in Table  3 apply. All specifications include a constant, firm-country-product and tax regime specific time effects.
